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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from a final order of the New Jersey 
district court in a diversity action.  The order granted 
defendant Kim's motion for summary judgment, denied a similar 
motion by plaintiff, Choi, and dismissed with prejudice the 
complaint against the other two defendants.  Our review is 
plenary. 
 I.  FACTS 
 Choi, a South Korean native, entered into an agreement 
with Kim, also a South Korean, under which Choi agreed to export 
cash boxes to Kim.  Choi shipped the boxes to Kim for sale in the 
United States, but Kim failed to pay for them.   
 In an effort to secure payment, Choi persuaded Kim to give 
him a promissory note for the amount due.  The note, executed in 
Korea, was accompanied by a "notarial deed" ("deed").  The deed 
included a "compulsory execution" clause, which provided, as 
translated, that "[i]f the promissor delay a payment of the 
promissory note to the creditor, the promissor acknowledged and 
stated that the promissor would be taken a compulsory execution 
immediately, he has no objection to make about it." Appendix at 
45. 
 Kim allegedly defaulted on the note, and Choi obtained an 
Order of Execution in Korea to enforce his rights to compulsory 
execution under the deed (the alleged Korean "judgment").1  
                     
1
.  The Order of Execution provides, as translated:  "NOTARIAL 
DEED:  I, the undersigned, grant this order of execution to the 
  
Thereafter, Kim allegedly fled to the United States and conveyed 
all, or a substantial portion, of his property to Nancy Soo Lee 
("Lee") and Golden Plastics Corporation, a New Jersey corporation 
("Golden Plastics"). See Complaint ¶¶ 4-5. 
 Choi, by his attorney in fact Song, commenced this action 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey against Kim, Lee, and Golden Plastics (collectively 
"defendants") seeking enforcement of his Korean "judgment." 
 In granting defendant Kim's motion for summary judgment, 
the district court first expressed skepticism that the deed and 
order of execution, prepared in Korea, amounted to a judgment 
under Korean law. See Song v. Kim, et al., No. Civ. A. 93-19, 
1993 WL 526340, *6-*7 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 1993) ("Mem. Op.").2  The 
court found that, even if the deed and order of execution 
constituted a judgment, it would not be recognized under 
controlling New Jersey law, because it was entered without 
according Kim minimal due process protections. Id. at *8.  
Therefore, the district court refused to recognize the Korean 
"judgment."  This appeal followed. 
 II. DISCUSSION 
 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 Before addressing the merits, the district court 
considered whether diversity jurisdiction existed.  In doing so, 
(..continued) 
creditor, In Sik Choi to perform a compulsory execution for the 
debtor (promissor), Hyung Soo Kim." Appendix at 46. 
2
.  The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice 
against defendants Lee and Golden Plastics. Mem. Op. at *8. 
  
it was required to decide who was the real party in interest 
under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 See 
Mem. Op. at 2; see also Bumberger v. Insurance Co. of North 
America, 952 F.2d 764, 768 (3d Cir. 1991); Field V. 
Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293, 302 (3d Cir. 1980).  In its 
summary judgment opinion, the court concluded that the caption of 
the complaint showed that Song was the only named "plaintiff" in 
the action. Mem. Op. at *8 n.2.  It then held that because Choi, 
not Song, was the real party in interest, it was inclined to 
dismiss the action under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Id. at *3.  The district court, nevertheless, 
proceeded to address the merits of plaintiff's claim for what it 
said were reasons of judicial economy. Id. at *4.  It concluded 
that it was free to do so because 1) Rule 17(a) was procedural in 
nature; 2) the case could have been continued or the complaint 
refiled with Choi as the named plaintiff; and 3) Choi's inclusion 
in the action would not destroy diversity jurisdiction. Id.  
                     
3
.  Rule 17(a) provides in relevant part: 
     Rule 17.  Parties Plaintiff and Defendant; Capacity  
 
 (a) Real Party in Interest.  Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. . . .  No action shall be dismissed on 
the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest until a reasonable 
time has been allowed after objection for 
ratification of commencement of the action by, or 
joinder or substitution of, the real party in 
interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the 
action had been commenced in the name of the real 
party in interest. 
 
    FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). 
  
 We need not determine whether the district court was free 
to proceed to the merits.  We so conclude because of our 
disagreement with the district court's ruling that Song was the 
only named plaintiff in the complaint.  We turn to that issue. 
 On January 18, 1992, Choi executed a Power of Attorney 
that gave Song the express power to bring suit. See Appendix at 
56, ¶ 1.4  Thereupon, as Choi's attorney in fact or agent, Song 
instituted the present action in the district court.  The 
complaint is captioned in relevant part as follows: 
 
 In Shik Choi  ) 
 . . . .   ) 
    ) 
 BY AND THROUGH  ) 
    ) 
 Murphy Inbum Song  ) 
 . . . .   ) 
   Plaintiff ) 
    ) 
 v.   ) 
 . . . .  
   
Appendix at 63.   
 This court has found a number of cases where attorneys in 
fact initiated the suits on behalf of named principals or 
plaintiffs.  In those cases, the captions were drafted in the 
same way as the caption in the present complaint. See, e.g., 
Canton v. Duvergee, 438 F.2d 1218 (3d Cir. 1971); National Ins. 
Underwriters v. Mark, 704 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Colo. 1989); 
Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance v. Hills, 413 F. Supp. 1193 
                     
4
.  Generally, an agent may be expressly authorized to institute 
legal proceedings on behalf of his principal. See 3 AM. JUR.2D 
Agency § 97 (1986). 
  
(W.D. Mo. 1976); Wimberly By Bauer v. Furlow, 869 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1994).  These cases support the conclusion that Song, as 
attorney in fact, instituted the present action on behalf of 
Choi. 
 It is true that the complaint contained one reference to 
Song, rather than Choi, as the plaintiff.  See Complaint ¶ 2.  
However, the remainder of the complaint clearly identified Choi, 
not Song, as the named plaintiff.  Indeed, defendants' answer 
indicates that the defendants knew that Choi was the named 
plaintiff. 
 In a footnote in its opinion, the district court 
questioned the way in which plaintiff's summary judgment motion 
was styled.  See Mem. Op. at *8 n.2.  The court stated that 
plaintiff's summary judgment motion was entitled "Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment."  The court "wondered" whether 
"inadvertent error has created the impression that Choi is also a 
named plaintiff, or if Song's counsel is simply unsure as to how 
this action should be styled." Id.  Despite this statement, the 
court confined its analysis to the complaint and concluded that 
Song was the only named plaintiff. 
 However, a reading of the entire summary judgment motion, 
including the caption on page one, reasonably indicates that 
Choi, not Song, was the named plaintiff, and that Song brought 
the present suit as Choi's agent pursuant to the power of 
attorney.  Thus, we are inclined to agree with the district court 
that plaintiff's counsel probably made an typographical error in 
entitling the motion in the plural. 
  
 We conclude that the complaint, reasonably construed, 
alleges that Choi, not Song, is not only the named plaintiff,5 
but also, as the district court found, the real party in 
interest.6  As such, Choi has standing to bring this action as 
plaintiff. 
 We now consider the merits of this timely appeal. 
 B. The Status of the Deed and Order of Execution  
  Choi contends that the district court erred in concluding 
that the Korean Code of Civil Procedure does not provide a debtor 
with a procedure to challenge the order of execution in a Korean 
court.  As a result, Choi argues, the judgment was not obtained 
in violation of due process, and, therefore, the district court 
should have recognized it. 
 As we have noted, the district court expressed skepticism 
as to whether the deed and order of execution constitute a valid 
judgment.  It, nevertheless, assumed, arguendo, that the 
                     
5
.  In his brief to this court, Song, as attorney in fact for 
Choi, relies on Zaubler v. Picone, 473 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2d Dep't 1984) to support his bringing the present suit on 
behalf of Choi.  In Zaubler, the Second Department held that a 
partner's attorney in fact, absent any indication to the 
contrary, was authorized to institute an action in his 
principal's name. Id. at 582.  This argument, and the reliance on 
Zaubler, is a further indication that Song did not institute the 
present action on his own behalf.  The action was brought by 
Song, as attorney in fact, in the name of his principal Choi. 
6
.  In the Notice of Appeal, Song erroneously designated himself 
as the "plaintiff," appealing the order of the district court's 
dated December 17, 1993.  On September 23, 1994, this court, on 
Song's motion, substituted Choi for Song pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 43(b) (because Choi was the real party in 
interest). 
 
  
documents constituted a judgment. See Mem. Op. at *7.  However, 
the district court referred to and treated the documents as a 
valid confession of judgment. See id.  We will assume, without 
deciding, that the deed and order of execution amount to a valid 
foreign confession of judgment.  We will now consider whether New 
Jersey would recognize this Korean confession of judgment. 
 The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between 
the United States of America and The Republic of Korea, 8 U.S.T. 
2217, elevates a Korean judgment to the status of a sister state 
judgment. See Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104, 106 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 389 (1993) (elevating a 
Greek judgment to the status of sister state judgment under 
identical provisions in Greek-U.S. treaty); see also Mem. Op. at 
*5.  In this diversity action, New Jersey law governed the 
district court's determination whether to recognize a foreign 
country or sister state judgment. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia 
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).7  
                     
7
.  The Restatement of the Law (Second) Conflict of Laws 
provides: 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States has never 
passed upon the question whether federal or State 
law governs the recognition of foreign nation 
judgments.  The consensus among the State courts 
and lower federal courts that have passed upon the 
question is that, apart from federal question 
cases, such recognition is governed by State law 
and that the federal courts will apply the law of 
the State in which they sit. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 98 cmt c (Supp. 1988) (emphasis 
added). 
  
 In New Jersey, sister state judgments by confession are 
entitled to full faith and credit.8 United Pac. Ins. Co. v. 
Estate of Lamanna, 436 A.2d 965, 968-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1981); see Somportex Ltd., 453 F.2d at 440.9  However, New Jersey 
courts will not enforce these foreign judgments if the rendering 
state 1) lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, 
2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and 3) failed to provide 
the judgment debtor adequate notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. See Estate of Lamanna, 436 A.2d at 968-74; City of Phila. 
v. Stadler, 395 A.2d 1300, 1303 (Burlington County Ct. 1978), 
aff'd, 413 A.2d 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 
427 A.2d 563 (N.J. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 997 (1981); see 
also Maglio & Kendro, Inc., 558 A.2d at 1373.  In this case, 
neither personal nor subject matter jurisdiction is at issue.  
The issue is whether Korea provided the debtor, Kim, with notice 
of the entry of the order of execution and an opportunity to be 
heard as to its validity. 
                     
8
.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 1.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, "That clause 
directs the courts of each state to give preclusive effect to the 
judgments of a sister state." Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & 
Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 596 (N.J. 1991). 
9
.  As the district court pointed out, in New Jersey valid 
foreign judgments are also entitled to full faith and credit. See 
Watkins, 591 A.2d at 596; Maglio & Kendro, Inc. v. Superior 
Enerquip Corp., 558 A.2d 1371, 1357 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1989). 
  
 The district court stated that although Kim waived his 
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to execution 
on the deed, it was unable to find any provision in the Korean 
Code that provided Kim with an opportunity to vacate or challenge 
the "judgment" once the creditor acted upon the order of 
execution. See  Mem. Op. at *7.  All parties disagree with the 
district court and agree that provisions exist that allow a 
debtor to challenge a judgment in Korea. See Brief of Appellant 
at 22, 30, Choi v. Kim, et al. (No. 94-5036); Supplemental Brief 
of Appellant at 8-9, Choi v. Kim, et al. (No. 94-5036); 
Supplemental Brief of Appellees at 6 (unnumbered pages), Choi v. 
Kim, et al. (No. 94-5036) (Defendants' point out that "[a] 
judgement [sic] debtor is entitled to challenge the judgment in 
accord with the procedures of the Korean Code of Civil 
Procedure.").  The parties, however, disagree as to whether 
Korean law provides every judgment debtor with notice of the 
entry of an order of execution. 
 Defendants argue that provisions to challenge the deed and 
order of execution are meaningless because the debtor, Kim, was 
never notified of the entry of the order of execution. Id.  As a 
result, Kim could not challenge the deed or the order of 
execution. Id.  We will assume, without deciding, that the 
parties have correctly stated the Korean law (regarding the 
existence of provisions to challenge the entry of the order of 
execution) and next determine whether the debtor was provided 
with adequate notice of the entry of the order of execution, so 
that he might challenge it. 
  
 In the deed the debtor waived his right to notice and the 
opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of the order of 
execution.  This is not in dispute.  As this court has recently 
pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has held that a 
judgment debtor's "constitutional right to due process was not 
violated when judgment was confessed against him . . . without 
prior notice or hearing, because `due process rights to notice 
and hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to waiver.'" 
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1270 
(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting D.H. Overmeyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 
405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972)) (internal citations omitted).  This 
holding has been adopted as the law in New Jersey. See Estate of 
Lamanna, 436 A.2d at 969-70.  In this case, the waiver was proper 
and did not offend due process.10 
 What does offend due process, defendants argue, is that 
the debtor was never notified of the entry of the order of 
execution and, therefore, was unable to challenge either the 
order of execution or the execution clause in the deed.  We turn 
now to that issue. 
 In Estate of Lamanna, the court evaluated the Pennsylvania 
confession of judgment procedure, and held that for a confession 
of judgment to satisfy due process, there must at least be some 
provision for post-judgment notice and hearing─before the 
                     
10
.  The waiver must be made knowingly and voluntarily. D.H. 
Overmeyer Co., Inc., 405 U.S. at 185; Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1270; 
Estate of Lamanna, 436 A.2d at 969-70.  In the present case, 
there has been no claim that the waiver was coerced or in any way 
not consented to knowingly or voluntarily. 
  
deprivation of debtor's property takes place. See id. at 969-70; 
973-74.11  The debtor must be given an opportunity to challenge 
the initial waiver of pre-judgment notice and hearing in the 
confession clause and to raise any defenses to the debt or the 
entry of the judgment. See id.; see also D.H. Overmeyer Co., Inc. 
v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1272 
(discussing a court's review of a waiver in a confessed 
judgment); Girard Trust Bank v. Martin, 557 F.2d 386 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977).12  The Estate of Lamanna court 
concluded that because the debtor did not receive pre-deprivation 
notice, it could not raise defenses to the earlier waiver 
contained in the confessed judgment. 
 In the present case, defendants claim that the debtor, 
Kim, never received notice of the entry of the execution clause.  
Choi claims that because Kim was present when the deed was 
prepared, and was thereby aware of the compulsory execution 
clause, and signed it, there was implicit notice of execution.  
However, in Estate of Lamanna, where the judgment debtors 
                     
11
.  The Lamanna's Estate court adopted the rule articulated in 
Community Thrift Club, Inc. v. Dearborn Acceptance Corp., 487 F. 
Supp. 877 (N.D. Ill. 1980).  In Community Thrift, the court held 
that notice and an opportunity to challenge the waiver of due 
process is not sufficient "if the debtor cannot challenge the 
cognovit clause prior to the deprivation of his property through 
execution of the confessed judgment." Id. at 883. 
12
.  The New Jersey legislature has imposed stricter requirements 
on the in-state confession of judgment practice.  Rule 4:45-2 of 
the New Jersey Rules Governing Civil Practice (entitled the 
Procedure to Confess Judgment) requires that a judgment debtor be 
given notice even before the judgment is entered. See N.J. CIVIL 
PRACTICE RULES R. 4:45-2.   
  
executed a similar cognovit clause, this implicit "notice" did 
not satisfy due process.  Thus, there is no evidence that the 
debtor was notified at the time the order of execution was 
issued.  In fact, when a debtor is "abroad," as was the case 
here, the Korean Code allows a creditor to dispense with any 
notice before compulsory execution. See KOREAN CODE CIV. P., Art. 
502 (1990). (In other cases, some form of notification is 
required. See  id., Art. 501.).  As in Estate of Lamanna, this 
lack of notice would render any provisions for challenging the 
"judgment" meaningless.  Under New Jersey law, the Korean 
procedure does not comport with due process. 
 III. CONCLUSION 
 The order of the district court will be affirmed. 
  
 
 
In Sik Choi v. Hyung Soo Kim, et al. 
No. 94-5036 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 I agree with the majority that if one were to reach the 
issue of whether the laws of South Korea accorded the defendant, 
Kim, American due process in the circumstances predicating this 
lawsuit, one would likely reach the conclusion the majority 
espouses.  However, I do not think we should pursue that course.  
I believe that before we render an opinion which finds the legal 
system of a foreign sovereign wanting in that it produces 
judgments that do not comport with our homegrown notions of 
justice, prudence dictates that we determine whether what we are 
criticizing is in fact a "judgment" at all.  Since the plaintiff, 
Choi, did not establish his prima facie case for domestication of 
the ostensible South Korean judgment, I would grant summary 
judgment on that ground and leave the due process concerns for 
another day. 
  
 
 A. 
 A plaintiff has a prima facie burden when he or she 
asserts that he or she is entitled to enforcement in one state of 
a court judgment of another.  Courts in a variety of 
jurisdictions have recognized this basic burden:  a proffered 
judgment must at least appear to be a valid judgment before an 
enforcing court will accord it a presumption of enforceability.  
E.g., Knighton v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 856 S.W.2d 206, 
209 (Tex. App. -- Houston [1 Dist.] 1993) (noting that prima 
facie case of enforcement is demonstrated upon introduction of "a 
foreign judgment [that] appears to be a valid, final, and 
subsisting judgment"); Fischer v. Kipp, 277 P.2d 598 (Kan. 1954) 
("duly authenticated copies" of foreign judgments suffice to make 
out prima facie case for enforcement); see generally Fred R. 
Surface & Assoc., Inc. v. Worozbyt, 260 S.E.2d 762, 764 (Ga. App. 
1979) (judgment creditor's mere assertion of indebtedness, 
without tender of judgment, does not prove its case).  Thus, the 
Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which describes 
materials that are entitled to full faith and credit, states in 
pertinent part: 
 The records and judicial proceedings of any 
court of any . . . State, Territory or 
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be 
proved or admitted in other courts within the 
United States and its Territories and 
Possessions by the attestation of the clerk 
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal 
exists, together with a certificate of a 
  
 
judge of the court that the said attestation 
is in proper form. 
Although we have previously explained that the mode of 
authenticating court records described in section 1738 is not 
exclusive (United States v. Mathies, 350 F.2d 963, 966 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1965)), the statute clearly reflects the sense that not just 
any piece of paper can serve as evidence of a judgment satisfying 
a plaintiff's prima facie burden. 
 Of course, the issue of whether a putative judgment is 
in fact a judgment -- that is, "the sentence of the law given by 
[a] court as the result of proceedings instituted therein for the 
redress of an injury" (Allegheny County v. Maryland Cas. Co., 132 
F.2d 894, 897 (3d Cir. 1943) -- does not arise very often in the 
garden variety full faith and credit case.  Full faith and credit 
cases usually involve domestication or enforcement in one state 
of a judgment of the tribunal of another state.  It is ordinarily 
quite easy to tell whether a plaintiff has a "judgment" entitled 
to a presumption of validity.  Such documents tend to share 
common characteristics among the states of the Union.  
Furthermore, practitioners generally recognize that they should 
present a formal, properly authenticated copy of a judgment to 
the enforcing court.13 
                     
13
.  By contrast, this case is obviously more awkward than the 
usual full faith and credit case because it is only as a result 
of a treaty that South Korean judgments are accorded full faith 
and credit treatment.  See Maj. Op. at __ [Typescript at 8].  
Thus, because of the treaty, courts in the United States are 
  
 
 Even when a party is seeking enforcement of a confessed 
judgment, in the ordinary case the putative judgment would have 
the appearance of a judicial or quasi-judicial instrument.  E.g., 
N.J. R. 4:45-2 (court issues confessed judgment); Pa. Civ. Pro. 
R. 2951(a) (prothonotary issues confessed judgment upon filing of 
instrument with confession of judgment clause).  Thus, if a 
litigant arrived at the courthouse door in New Jersey with a 
document that looked, to all the world, like a notarized private 
agreement signed in (for instance) Nevada between himself and 
another party, the enforcing court would reasonably look upon the 
ostensible "judgment" with suspicion. 
 That was precisely the case here.  Choi presented a 
document that appeared to be nothing more than a private contract 
between himself and Kim, notarized by a South Korean notary.  Not 
surprisingly, the district court noted that it was "skeptical 
that the Deed and Order" at issue "constitute[d] a valid 
judgment, as if rendered and entered by a Korean court of law."  
Song v. Kim, et al., No. Cir. A. 93-19, 1993 WL 526340, *6 (D. 
N.J. Dec. 16, 1993) ("Op.").  In fact, the court ruled that 
"[b]ased on the parties' submissions, the Court finds that no 
(..continued) 
forced to credit and enforce legal instruments that may be 
unfamiliar to us -- both in language and in appearance.  Absent 
the treaty, the South Korean "judgment" at issue here would have 
been scrutinized under the less deferential standards used to 
determine the validity and enforceability of foreign-country 
judgments.  See generally Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States §§ 481, 482 (1987). 
  
 
Korean court has entered a judgment against Kim, nor has Choi 
ever brought the matter before a Korean court."  Id. at *7.  The 
court should have stopped there:  Choi had failed to prove his 
prima facie case, and his case should have been dismissed with 
prejudice.14 
                     
14
. Choi argues that supplemental materials submitted to us 
during this appeal establish that he has a valid judgment 
entitled to full faith and credit.  Because I believe that the 
district court should have ended its inquiry with a finding that 
Choi had not established his prima facie case in the district 
court, I would not make any determinations of South Korean law 
here.  However, from the parties' submissions and my independent 
research, it seems apparent that Choi did not strictly follow 
South Korean procedures for obtaining a valid confessed judgment.  
First, Article 522 of the South Korean Civil Code states that 
"[a]n execution clause of a deed drawn up by a notary public 
shall be issued by the notary public who is preserving the deed."  
Art. 522(1).  Although the same law and notary office -- Dong Wha 
Law & Notary Office Inc. -- issued both the notarial deed and the 
order of execution in this case, different people at different 
branches of Dong Wha actually performed the notarizing.  See App. 
45 (notarial deed executed by Choong Won Kim of Dong Wha office 
at 58-7 Seosomun-dong, Joong-ku Seoul, Korea); id. 46 (execution 
order signed by Ho Yang Shin of Dong Wha office at 814-6 
Yoksam-dong, Kangnam-ku Seoul, Korea).  Second, Article 522(1) of 
the South Korean Civil Code also states that the notary "who is 
preserving the deed" must issue the execution clause.  Similarly, 
Article 56-2(3) of the South Korean Notary Public Act states with 
respect to notarial deeds that 
 
  When a notary public prepares a [notarial] 
deed . . . he shall make a script of the deed 
in adherence to the original of [sic] bill or 
check, and an original and a transcript of 
[sic] deed in adherence to a copy of [sic] 
bill or check, and deliver then the script to 
the creditor as specified on the bill or 
check, and the transcript, to the debtor 
thereon.  The original of the deed shall be 
preserved by the notary public. 
 
  
 
 B. 
 However, although the district court had essentially 
found that Choi had not made out a prima facie case, the court 
nevertheless took the matter a step further.  The court stated 
that although the instrument before it had not been proven to be 
a judgment, that "may be beside the point, as the Court will 
accept, for purposes of argument, that [sic] Deed and Execution 
Order do constitute a valid judgment under Korean law."  Op. at 
*7.  Having made this assumption, the district court then 
addressed whether the South Korean legal system had accorded Kim 
American-style due process.  The district court's analysis of the 
"process" provided by South Korean law is brief enough that I 
quote it in full: 
 While Kim may have waived his right to notice 
and hearing prior to execution on the Deed, 
the Court is unable to ascertain whether 
Korea provides Kim any opportunity to vacate 
or challenge this `judgment' once Choi acts 
upon the Execution Order.  As the Court 
understands Song's argument, Choi could seize 
any of Kim's attachable assets in Korea 
without ever having a Korean court of law 
enter a judgment on the Deed and Execution 
Order.  Whether or not this is a correct 
(..continued) 
(Emphasis added.)  There is no indication that any notary office 
is "preserving" the deed in this case.  To the contrary, the 
notarial deed itself states that "this original of the deed and 
its copy are made according to the request of the creditor and 
the debtor and the original is gave [sic] to the creditor, In Sik 
Choi and the copy is gave [sic] to the debtor, Hyung Soo Kim."  
App. 45.  Therefore, it does not appear from the record before us 
that there was a copy or original left to be "preserved" at Dong 
Wha. 
  
 
interpretation of Korean law, and 
irrespective of the notice, hearing and 
opportunity to vacate questions, this kind of 
judgment without judicial oversight is 
anathema to our concept of due process. 
Id. (emphasis added).  As the italicized portions of the district 
court opinion demonstrate, the district court did not ascertain 
what the law of South Korea was, but rather determined that what 
might be the law of South Korea did not accord Kim American due 
process. 
 On appeal, the majority takes the same path.  The 
majority first assumes that a valid judgment was before the 
district court (Maj. Op. at __ [Typescript at 8]), then approves 
the district court's conclusion that what might be the South 
Korean law implicated here did not afford Kim American due 
process (Maj. Op. at __ (noting that majority "assume[d], without 
deciding, that the parties have correctly stated the Korean 
law"), __-__ (determining that according to what the parties say 
South Korean law was, "the Korean procedure does not comport with 
due process") [Typescript at 10, 10-13]). 
 I believe that the district court erred in assuming 
that Choi had presented a valid judgment to the district court.  
That is because, having made this assumption, the court was 
forced to decide whether the laws of South Korea pertaining to 
instruments analogous to American confessions of judgment accord 
American due process.  There having been a less intrusive manner 
  
 
in which this case could be resolved (the finding that Choi had 
failed to make out a prima facie case for enforcement), comity 
counsels that American courts avoid subjecting the laws of a 
foreign sovereign to evaluations based on American notions of due 
process. 
 I do not mean to suggest that comity prevents us from 
subjecting the laws of South Korea to a due process evaluation in 
all cases, or even many cases.  Rather, I would invoke comity in 
the prudential sense that we should avoid disparaging the law of 
a foreign sovereign which, though certainly not intended, I 
believe both the district court opinion and the majority opinion 
have the effect of doing.  As we have observed recently, comity, 
though difficult to define, is in one respect "a version of the 
golden rule:  a `concept of doing to others as you would have 
them do to you . . . .'"  Republic of the Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994), quoting 
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (S.D. N.Y. 1994).  I 
would not want a tribunal in South Korea, which could resolve on 
narrow grounds a case involving a putative American judgment, to 
reach out and judge our own procedures as unjust based on South 
Korean notions of what process is due a litigant. 
 For the foregoing reasons, I am unable to join in the 
majority's analysis although I do concur in the judgment. 
